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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
We are asked to determine whether the Bankruptcy 
Court had jurisdiction to require payment of post- 
confirmation trustee's fees before closing the debtor's case. 
We also address the threshold issue of our jurisdiction to 
consider this appeal in light of the District Court's remand 
of the matter to the Bankruptcy Court. We conclude that 
we have appellate jurisdiction and that the Bankruptcy 
Court did in fact have jurisdiction over the award of fees in 
question. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court's 
order that so held. As discussed in detail below, the 
Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 157 and 28 U.S.C. S 1334, and we have jurisdiction on 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(d). The District Court 
had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court's decision 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(a). 
 
Although the award of trustee's fees in bankruptcy cases 
has become a routine occurrence since S 1930 of Title 28 of 
the United States Code was first enacted in 1986, 
Congress's recent amendments to S 1930(a)(6) that imposed 
post-confirmation trustee's fees in all pending cases have 
created a controversy, with potential and actual legal and 
practical implications. Historically, S 1930(a)(6) set forth a 
scheme to impose the costs of the United States Trustee 
Program on its users. See H.R. Rep. No. 99-764, at 22 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5227, 5234. The 
statute originally provided, in relevant part, that"a 
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quarterly fee shall be paid to the United States trustee . . . 
in each case under chapter 11 of title 11 . . . for each 
quarter (including any fraction thereof) until a plan is 
confirmed or the case is converted or dismissed, whichever 
occurs first." Pub. L. No. 99-554, S 117, 100 Stat. 3088 
(1986). On January 26, 1996, Congress amended the 
quarterly fee provision to require payment of fees post- 
confirmation, by striking out the language providing that 
the fees would accrue until "a plan is confirmed," so that 
the statute now reads that the fees should be paid"until 
the case is converted or dismissed, whichever occursfirst." 
Pub. L. No. 104-91, S 101(a), 110 Stat. 7 (1996) & Pub. L. 
No. 104-99, S 211, 110 Stat. 26 (1996). 
 
After Congress passed the January 26, 1996 amendment, 
there was some confusion as to whether the amendment 
applied to cases in which plans had been confirmed prior to 
the amendment. In response, Congress enacted a second 
amendment to the quarterly fee provision on September 30, 
1996, providing that "the fees under 28 U.S.C.S 1930(a)(6) 
shall accrue and be payable from and after January 27, 
1996, in all cases (including, without limitation, any cases 
pending as of that date), regardless of confirmation status 
of their plans." Pub. L. No. 104-208, S 109(d), 110 Stat. 
3009 (1996). It is therefore clear that Congress has imposed 
a specific requirement that trustee's fees accrue and are 
payable after confirmation and up to closing of the case, 




1. It is generally agreed, and the parties before us do not argue 
otherwise, that the legislative scheme requiring payment of fees until the 
case is "converted or dismissed, whichever occursfirst" should be read 
so as to add "or closed." The Tenth Circuit recently decided this issue in 
United States Trustee v. CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In re CF&I 
Fabricators of Utah, Inc.), 150 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 1998). Rejecting the 
argument that cases that are neither converted nor dismissed, but are 
successfully closed, are exempt from the fees, the court explained that 
the language of the statute providing that the fees were to be paid in 
"each" case under chapter 11 supported the conclusion that the statute 
applied in all three cases. Id. at 1236. The court also noted that, even 
though the statute does not explicitly state that fees would terminate 
upon "closure" of the case, it is unreasonable to assume otherwise, 
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In the specific case before us, the debtor confirmed its 
plan of reorganization in June of 1995. The plan provides 
for payment of all priority and administrative claims, sets 
forth the treatment of several specific creditors, and 
provides that unsecured creditors will receive a pro rata 
distribution of the remaining funds, to be paid in 
installments commencing 73 months from confirmation, 
which would be in July of 2001.2 The debtor's plan is a 
liquidating plan; the debtor ceased its business and sold all 
of its assets as part of the plan and is distributing proceeds 
to creditors. The plan "estimates" that the fund available for 
unsecured creditors would be $83,042.40 and that 
unsecured creditors should receive 25-33% on account of 
their claims. 
 
The debtor moved for entry of a final order to close the 
case in April 1996, and the trustee objected on the basis 
that post-confirmation trustee's fees had not been paid.3 
The Bankruptcy Court entered an order granting the 
debtor's motion but reserving the issue of what fees were 
due. At oral argument before us, it was conceded that the 
funds awaiting distribution to unsecured creditors are on 
hand with the debtor's agent and that the post- 
confirmation trustee's fees at issue are in the approximate 
amount of $750. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
because once a case is closed it is no longer a case"under chapter 11" 
under the quarterly fee statute, and because there is no possibility of 
conversion or dismissal after closure. Id.; see also In re A.H. Robins 
Co., 
Inc., 219 B.R. 145, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1998). The Sixth Circuit came 
to a similar conclusion, albeit by different reasoning, in Vergos v. 
Gregg's 
Enters., Inc., 159 F.3d 989, 990-93 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that, 
although S 1930(a)(6) is ambiguous, reading the statute to require 
termination of fees upon closure is consistent with Congressional intent). 
 
2. The Bankruptcy Court decided this case en banc because several 
dozen cases were impacted by the new requirement. However, we can 
only address the case before us on its own facts. This is especially 
important as we determine our jurisdiction to hear this matter on 
appeal, which, as we note below, may turn on the unique facts of the 
case. 
 
3. It is unclear whether the trustee actuallyfiled a claim for fees or 
otherwise sought enforcement, but the record indicates that the debtor 
did file an objection to the trustee's claim. 
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The en banc Bankruptcy Court ultimately determined 
that the bankruptcy court lacks jurisdiction over post- 
confirmation claims and the trustee must go elsewhere to 
pursue these claims. En route to reaching this conclusion, 
however, the court entertained numerous difficult questions 
posed, and problems presented, by the legislative scheme 
that, the court felt, created an obligation seemingly 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code 
and the practical and legal implications of belatedly 
imposing such fees in the context of a confirmed plan.4 
 
Although neither of the parties on appeal argues that the 
Bankruptcy Court's holding was broader than its 
jurisdictional pronouncement (nor does either seek a 
remand in order for the District Court to address other 
issues argued to the court), nonetheless, each of the parties 
urges its own view as to whether the fees in question are to 
be paid in the context of a confirmed reorganization plan. 
However, this issue has little bearing on our ruling as to 
the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction. It may, however, have 
some bearing on the question of our jurisdiction over this 
appeal, as becomes apparent in our discussion below. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court reviewed cases commenting on the 
limited role of bankruptcy courts after confirmation, and 
drew from them the conclusion that its jurisdiction was 
limited to matters concerning the implementation or 
execution of a confirmed plan, and did not extend to 
enforcement of the post-confirmation fee provision.5 The 
Bankruptcy Court focused its analysis on 11 U.S.C. 
S 1142(b), which provides that, in order to implement the 
plan, the bankruptcy court may direct the debtor to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The court explored the enforceability of such a claim, its status as a 
priority or administrative claim, the debtor's ability to modify a plan, 
who 
would be liable for such a fee, the potential for violation of the takings 
clause of the Constitution, and, finally, the possible result that by 
permitting collection, plan defaults would result, undermining both the 
bankruptcy and trustee's fee statutes. 
 
5. The Bankruptcy Court suggested that it would have had jurisdiction 
if the confirmed plan reserved jurisdiction over the post-confirmation fee 
issue. Of course, the confirmed plan did not address the post- 
confirmation fees, since they did not exist at the time the plan was 
confirmed. 
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perform such acts as are necessary for the consummation 
of the confirmed plan. The District Court addressed the 
issue of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction in the broad 
sense and determined that the Bankruptcy Court did in 
fact have jurisdiction over the award of the trustee's fees. 
The District Court accordingly remanded the case back to 
the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings. 
 
Our review of the District Court's decision is governed by 
the principle that we are in as good a position to evaluate 
the Bankruptcy Court's findings as the District Court was. 
We review the Bankruptcy Court's findings by the same 
standard that should have been employed by the District 
Court to determine if the District Court erred in its review. 
Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 
102 (3d Cir. 1981). Thus, our review of the legal questions 
presented in this case is plenary. First Jersey Nat'l Bank v. 
Brown (In re Brown), 951 F.2d 564, 567 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
We will affirm the District Court's ruling and adopt its 
reasoning. The District Court correctly concluded that an 
analysis of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction begins with 
28 U.S.C. S 1334, not with 11 U.S.C. S 1142. See Belcufine 
v. Aloe, 112 F.3d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 1997). Section 1334 
provides that the district courts "shall have original and 
exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11," and 
"original, but not exclusive, jurisdiction of all civil 
proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related 
to cases under title 11." 28 U.S.C. S 1334(a)-(b). The 
Bankruptcy Court, by virtue of referral by the District 
Court, has jurisdiction over cases falling under these 
categories. See 28 U.S.C. S 157(a)-(b). 
 
We agree with the District Court's conclusion that the 
trustee's action to enforce the post-confirmation fee 
provision is "related to" or "arising in" the bankruptcy, and 
was thus within the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction. A 
matter is "related to" a chapter 11 case if it " `could 
conceivably have any effect on the estate being 
administered in bankruptcy.' " Belcufine , 112 F.3d at 636 
(quoting Pacor v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 
1984)). Belcufine further defined the test as whether the 
outcome of the case " `could alter the debtor's rights, 
liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or 
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negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the 
handling and administration of the bankrupt estate.' " Id. 
The trustee's award of fees clearly satisfies this test, 
because it directly relates to the debtor's liabilities -- in fact 
it creates a liability -- and could impact the handling and 
administration of the estate. 
 
Although finding that the trustee's action is related to a 
bankruptcy case is sufficient in order to establish the 
Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction, the District Court also 
found that the trustee's action might even be said to "arise 
in" bankruptcy. We agree. Proceedings "arise in" 
bankruptcy if they have no existence outside of the 
bankruptcy. See Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 
97 (5th Cir. 1987). By definition, an action for trustee's fees 
pursuant to S 1930(a)(6) applies only in chapter 11 cases, 
during the pendency of the case.6 
 
Furthermore, 11 U.S.C. S 1142(b), the provision relied 
upon by the Bankruptcy Court to support its conclusion 
that its jurisdiction was limited, does not change the 
jurisdictional analysis under S 1334. Section 1142(b) 
provides that the bankruptcy court may take action to 
ensure the consummation of a confirmed plan; it does not 
provide that this is the only action the bankruptcy court 
may entertain post-confirmation. As explained by the 
District Court, "[s]ection 1142(b) is a grant of authority to 
the bankruptcy court that channels, but does not abrogate, 
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction post-confirmation." 
United States Trustee v. Gryphon at the Stone Mansion, Inc., 
216 B.R. 764, 768 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 
We affirm the reasoning of the District Court as a proper 
statement of the breadth of the Bankruptcy Court's 
jurisdiction to entertain issues that necessarily must come 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because we have determined that this claim"arises in" bankruptcy, 
we need not be concerned about the extent of the Bankruptcy Court's 
power to resolve this claim on its own -- without reference to the 
district 
court -- on remand. Claims that by nature can only arise in a 
bankruptcy context are "core proceedings" that the bankruptcy court has 
comprehensive power to hear and decide by enteringfinal orders and 
judgments. See Torkelsen v. Maggio (In re The Guild & Gallery Plus, Inc.), 
72 F.3d 1171, 1178 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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its way prior to the close of the case. Although the 
Bankruptcy Court may have been justified in harboring 
genuine reservations as to the categorization and 
implementation of this claim imposed by Congress after the 
fact, nonetheless the Bankruptcy Court clearly had 
jurisdiction to entertain the trustee's claim and provide for 
it. 
 
We address our jurisdiction to entertain this appeal at 
this juncture because our decision is informed by the facts 
we have recounted and statutory provisions we have 
referenced. The prevailing rule followed by the majority of 
the circuit courts is that courts of appeals have jurisdiction 
over bankruptcy appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(d) 
notwithstanding a remand ordered by the district court if 
there is little left for the bankruptcy court to do. See In re 
Lopez, 116 F.3d 1191, 1192 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. 
Ct. 599 (1997) (explaining that such orders are appealable 
only if "the further proceedings contemplated are of a 
purely ministerial character"). Our court applies an even 
more liberal rule in determining appealability, balancing 
reluctance to broaden traditional interpretations offinality 
against desire to further the expeditious completion of the 
bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 1193-94; In re Market 
Square Inn, Inc., 978 F.2d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 1992). This 
rule is based on the principle that "finality" in the 
bankruptcy sense is a flexible concept, taking into account 
the protracted nature of many bankruptcy proceedings, and 
the waste of time and resources that might result if 
immediate appeal were denied. See Market Square Inn, 978 
F.2d at 120. 
 
Nonetheless, if the Bankruptcy Court proceedings on 
remand would be purely ministerial, we need not resort to 
the balancing test, since we would have jurisdiction under 
either the prevailing or our own test. In order to make that 
determination, we must answer the question: "What is left 
for the Bankruptcy Court to do on remand?" Here, the 
debtor has funds on hand awaiting distribution to 
unsecured creditors. It is up to the Bankruptcy Court to 
order trustee's fees to be paid from available funds in 
compliance with law. In fact, all the Bankruptcy Court has 
to do to assess the fees is look to the specific amounts 
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provided for in S 1930(a)(6). This action is indeed 
ministerial. 
 
This is not the situation which seemed to confound the 
Bankruptcy Court in its opinion, namely, where no funds 
are available. Nor do we view this, as the Bankruptcy Court 
clearly did, as a situation in which Congress has legislated 
a claim not cognizable in connection with a confirmed plan. 
To the contrary, we agree with the statement of the 
trustee's counsel that Congress's "mandate requiring 
payment of post-confirmation quarterly fees is not an effort 
to alter the terms of pre-existing debts; rather, it creates a 
new expense that did not exist before the plan was 
confirmed." Brief for Appellee at 7. Courts recently 
addressing the nature of these post-confirmation fees have 
regularly found them to be an administrative claim arising 
during the case that must be paid or provided for, and, that 
does not constitute an impermissible modification of the 
confirmed plan. See, e.g., CF&I Fabricators, 150 F.3d at 
1238 (noting that post-confirmation fees are administrative 
expenses attendant to an open case and are " `no different 
from taxes arising post confirmation, or any similar post- 
confirmation expenses not specified in the plan' " (quoting 
A.H. Robins, 219 B.R. at 148)). 
 
The holding in Holywell Corp. v. Smith, 503 U.S. 47 
(1992), is instructive on this issue. In Holywell, the 
Supreme Court rejected the argument that a trustee was 
not obligated to pay taxes that accrued post-confirmation 
because they were not provided for in the confirmed plan. 
Id. at 58. The Court noted that the tax liability did not arise 
until after the plan was confirmed, and that the plan did 
not and could not extinguish claims arising post- 
confirmation. Id. at 58-59. Like the tax liability in Holywell, 
the trustee's claim for post-confirmation fees did not exist 
until after the plan was confirmed, so the plan could not 
discharge the debtor's obligation to pay the fees. 
 
Notwithstanding the Bankruptcy Court's skepticism that 
Congress would impose fees in contravention of the scheme 
set out in the Bankruptcy Code, we suggest that, by 
amending S 1930(a)(6) as it did, Congress has in fact 
purposely changed the scheme so as to require payment of 
trustee's fees until the case is closed. The fact that the fees 
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do not fit nicely into plan parlance is irrelevant. Congress 
has mandated that they be paid.7 
 
We should also note that this issue should be of waning 
importance, with the passage of time. Debtors, now aware 
of this post-confirmation obligation, will reserve funds in 
order to fulfill this obligation. 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order 
of the District Court. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Courts have considered and rejected constitutional challenges to 
amended S 1930(a)(6) based on retroactivity and violation of the takings 
clause of the Fifth Amendment ("takings clause"). The retroactivity 
argument, although not raised specifically by appellant on appeal, has 
been rejected on the basis that the fee provision is not retroactive, or, 
alternatively, that even if it is retroactive, it is constitutionally 
sound 
because it is supported by a rational legislative purpose. See CF&I 
Fabricators, 150 F.3d at 1237-38; In re McLean Square Assocs., 201 B.R. 
436, 441 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996); A.H. Robins, 219 B.R. at 148; In re 
Richardson Serv. Corp., 210 B.R. 332, 334 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997). 
Appellant did raise a takings clause challenge to the statute, but it is 
also without merit. Application of the fee provision post-confirmation is 
not a violation of the takings clause because, due to the vagaries of the 
bankruptcy process, there can be no reasonable expectation that the 
amount of the final distribution will remain fixed throughout the 
process. See CF&I Fabricators, 150 F.3d at 1238-39 (noting that one of 
the elements of a takings clause violation is interference with reasonable 
investment-backed expectations, and that "[i]n a bankruptcy case as 
complex as this, we believe it would be patently unreasonable to expect 
no variability in the final amount available to plan distributees"). 
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